

2020 REVIEW OF HATE SPEECH AND FAKE NEWS IN CENTRAL ASIA



THE RESULTS OF MEDIA MONITORING WITHIN THE BRYCA PROJECT



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Introduction

Media experts described 2020 as the year of a “*tsunami of hate speech and disinformation*”¹. COVID-19, which began suddenly and spread with great speed, led to an infodemic in terms of news and information. A large number of conspiracy theories, from blaming Bill Gates and 5G technology for creating the virus as a tool for the control of mankind, to garlic as a remedy and local interpretations of the virus’ origin. All this has become a part of the global information space, and Central Asia is not an exception.

The pandemic has caused growth in hate speech on the Internet. In the framework of a study on hate speech in Facebook in Kazakhstan, conducted by MediaNet ICJ in 2017, the sociologist Serik Beisembayev stressed that “the cost” of hate speech has increased significantly within the context of the rapid development of Internet technologies, as well as general “smartphonization”. Now, it is not just a manifestation of the unfriendly intentions and beliefs of individual people, but also an important factor in social life. As the experience of some countries shows, once a text containing hate speech is published, it can have unpredictable consequences, up to open manifestations of hatred in real life.

In this review, we want to present the results of media monitoring conducted since January 2020 by the BRYCA project media monitoring team. We will tell you how the dynamics and tone of hate speech has changed in Central Asian states throughout the year. Also, in the review, we will reveal the most common fake news and disinformation related to the pandemic.

We would like to highlight that this review does not pretend to be an in-depth theoretical generalization of the hate speech topic in the region, nor a comprehensive analysis of all sources of information involving hate speech in Central Asia. Rather, our goal is to share the results of our project monitoring of specific social networks and complement existing research on this topic. In addition, all the examples of the hate speech provided in this document are for informational and context purposes only.

We do hope that our review will be useful for the general audience as well as professional in media and informational literacy, students and other interested readers.

¹ Journalist, 2020. Media experts recorded “tsunami of hate of speech and disinformation” because of COVID-19 throughout the world, available at <https://jrnlst.ru/fazana-media-fest>

Methodology

In our monitoring, we use the methodology of the informational-analytical center “Sova”, which has been specializing in monitoring and analysis in the field of nationalism, racism, hate crimes, hate speech, and relations between religious organizations for more than 20 years and which conducts regular research to identify the hate speech in the media and online.

This media monitoring is based on both quantitative and qualitative methods. A manual monitoring method was used when information was collected and documented. All messages containing hate speech, fake news and disinformation were manually monitored and sorted by a team of media monitors from the four BRYCA project countries. Due to the fact that automated monitoring can not always capture a context and identify an item of hate speech, we have chosen manual selection. At the beginning of the project, the media monitor team identified a list of keywords, which currently consists of **707 words** in Russian and four national languages (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik), as well as **96 sites, 88 groups and pages in social networks and 93 opinion leaders**.

The following factors were considered in the selection of media resources: number of visits, toxicity or strength of comments, number of articles and posts in online publications and social networks, genre of materials: post, news, analytics, multimedia (for online) contain all components (text, photo, video or audio), photo report, interview, survey, comment/opinion (editorial or author's), topic of the article/report, frequency of publications, coverage or publication of material with elements of hate speech. This selection method is also applied to public sites. When selecting opinion leaders, such parameters as the retransmission of posts, number of comments under posts, number of subscribers/friends, and recognition of the individual among the population were taken into account.

Quantitative component covers monitoring data of the media, social networks (groups and public), opinion leaders, and comments of the users on some sites of information agencies in news discussions. Our team recorded hate speech in the information space by gender, region, territory, ethnicity, race, religion and other social characteristics. Obtained data was documented in a special matrix, including screenshots, links to articles, posts, comments or images.

Qualitative component of monitoring includes analysis of messages, defines qualification of the tonality (soft, medium, hard) and types of identified hate speech based on specific key words and expressions that are often

found in the information space. Media monitors, when classifying the tonality of hate speech, used a method developed by A. Verkhovsky as a basis for their classification.

Hard “hate speech”

1. Direct calls for violence.
2. Calls for violence using general slogans.
3. Direct calls for discrimination.
4. Calls for discrimination in the form of general slogans.
5. Veiled calls for violence and discrimination (for example, positive propaganda of contemporary or historical examples of violence or discrimination).

Moderate “hate speech”

1. Justifying historical cases of discrimination and violence.
2. Publications and statements that question generally accepted historical facts of violence and discrimination.
3. Allegations of historical crimes committed by ethnic (or other) groups.
4. Indicating relations of any social group with local and / or foreign political and state structures in order to discredit it.
5. Statement on criminality of a particular ethnic group.
6. Arguments about disproportionate superiority of any ethnic group in material wealth, representation in power structures, etc.
7. Accusation of any social group in negative influence on society or the state.
8. Calls to avoid integration of certain social groups in the region (district, city, etc.).

Soft “Hate speech”

1. Creating a negative image of an ethnic group.
2. Mentioning the names of an ethnic group within a derogatory context.
3. Statement about inferiority of an ethnic group.
4. Statement about the moral shortcomings of an ethnic group.
5. Mentioning a social group or its representatives in a humiliating or offensive context (for example, within news on criminal activity).
6. Quoting xenophobic statements or publishing such texts without corresponding disclaimers that makes clear the opinion of the interviewee is not the position of the author of the text (journalist); providing space in a media for explicit nationalist propaganda without editorial comments or other disclaimers.

Background

The COVID-19 pandemic² dominated the past year, negatively affecting Central Asian states' economies and health systems. The countries of Central Asia faced a decline in GDP, unemployment growth, and disruption to the education system, and as a result, aggravated social problems in a form of domestic violence and increased vulnerability of the population.

For example, the World Bank estimates that in April 2020, the volume of remittances to Kyrgyzstan decreased by 14 percent³. And this year, half a million migrants working in Russia, lost their jobs and returned to Tajikistan. Many families were left without with no means to survive. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are among the five countries in the world that are the most dependent on remittances, where remittance transfers make up about a third of GDP. By the end of this 2020, the volume of remittances sent to the Central Asian countries decreased by an average of 28 percent⁴. A fall in commodity prices led to a devaluation of national currencies and a resultant rise in prices for goods and services. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2020, the inflation rate in Uzbekistan was 12.6 percent, in Kyrgyzstan, 10.6 percent, in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, 8 percent, in Kazakhstan it was 7 percent⁵.

According to official statistics on COVID-19, infections and deaths in the Central Asian countries remain relatively low, with the exception of some outbreaks in June and July. Strict isolation measures have likely prevented a massive spread of the virus in the region. However, these interventions at times violated human rights and freedoms⁶. For example, Amnesty International researchers pointed out an excessive use of force and restrictive measures: welding doors shut in the entrances of apartment buildings in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, blocking roads at the exit and entrance to big cities, etc.

At the same time, there was an infodemic. Both in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, political leaders have downplayed or denied the threat of the pandemic (as in Tajikistan) and promoted traditional medicine that has not proven its effectiveness. For example, the Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov

² OECD, 2020. OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/covid-19-crisis-response-in-central-asia_5305f172-en

³ Falling commodity prices, reduced remittances – COVID-19 pandemic led to growth of poverty in Central Asia, available at <https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/11/1390472>

³ UN News portal, 2020. Falling commodity prices, reduced remittances – COVID-19 pandemic led to growth of poverty in Central Asia, available at <https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/11/1390472>

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Fergana, 2020. Human right activists noted inadequacy of response from Tashkent and Nur-Sultan to COVID-19, available at <https://fergana.ru/news/117540/>

advised fumigating premises with smoke from harmel peganum leaves to prevent diseases⁷. Similar fake news periodically appeared in Tajikistan. The assertion that there is no coronavirus in the country has become a propaganda item for radical supporters of Islam: “*Tajiks are pure Muslims, and therefore the coronavirus has left out us*”. Following this, in February and early March, in response to China’s alleged oppression of Muslims, fake news such as “20 million Chinese have converted to Islam”⁸, became common in posts and comments.

From mid-March, information began to spread on networks and messages that “disinfection” [of the COVID-19 virus] will be carried out from helicopters. Or, the best treatment for coronavirus is garlic, honey, lemon and harmel peganum. Such information and statements from so-called experts caused a sharp demand and a rise in prices for these goods in the country. Our post on “coronavirus in a country without coronavirus” on Facebook (@BRYCACentralAsia) where we explained and showed the fake news and misinformation became very popular.



(Picture: (@BRYCACentralAsia post on 26 April 2020)

Presidential and parliamentary elections held in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan gave rise to an additional surge of online aggression. For example, during election-related unrest in October in 2020 in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz media was filled with fake news and disinformation related to the protests and the change of power. It is also worth noting that during the presidential election, cases of trolling and fake accounts in social networks increased, as alleged in [“Information about who exactly do the “troll factories” work for”](#)⁹. The journalists behind the report uncovered what they claim is the use of the fake accounts in a number of companies, for example, those owned/controlled by the families of Matraimov, ex-presidents Sooronbai Zheenbekov and Almazbek Atambaev. At the same time, in early October, the journalists claim an army of trolls run by Jeenbekov and the party “Mekenim Kyrgyzstan” (“Kyrgyzstan is my Motherland”), which participated in the elections, began to work in the interests of the current Prime Minister and acting President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Zhaparov. In addition, they say there are small groups of trolls engaged in supporting or discrediting individual politicians and parties. In Kazakhstan, there

⁷ Azathabar.org, 2020. At the meeting dedicated to the state development, Berdymukhamedov gave an advice to be protected against diseases using smoke of harmel peganum, available at <https://rus.azathabar.com/a/30487788.html>

⁸ Factcheck.kz, available here <https://factcheck.kz/claim-checking/verdict/fejk-kitajcy-massovo-prinimayut-islam/>

⁹ Factcheck.kg, 2020. Material “Troll factory” of Matraimovs and Zheenbekovs started working for Sadyr Zhaparov – Kaktus.media, October 9, 2020, available at <https://factcheck.kg/kyrgyz-na-sadyra-zhaparova-nachala-rabotat-fabrika-trollej-matraimovyh-i-zheenbekovyh-kaktus-media/>. Also material of Open Democracy “Everyone had about 200 accounts in the social networks”. How “troll factories” are organized in Kyrgyzstan, 13 November 2020, available at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/ru/fabriki-trollei-v-kyrgyzstane/>

were few examples of fake news about the elections, which is most likely due to weaker alternative candidates and stronger administrative control of the information space by the Kazakh authorities¹⁰.

Stricter measures against the spread of fake news and disinformation are a common tendency in Central Asian states. Almost all Central Asian countries have introduced criminal liability for dissemination of deliberately false information under the guise of reliable reports. Given the ambiguity of concepts that do not have a precise legal interpretation and allow for broad interpretation, many lawyers believe that criminal liability is too severe a punishment¹¹. There are regular reports that law enforcement agencies conducted “preventive talks”, as a result of which those disseminating allegedly fake news “repent” and publicly ask for forgiveness from the people¹².



Hate speech in Central Asian states

Over the past year, our team of media monitors has identified **4,936** examples of hate speech in the Internet space of four countries; Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. As a rule, such words as “kill”, “burn”, “destroy”, etc. are present in publications categorized as containing “hard” hate speech. In general, hard hate speech was present at roughly the same extent during the whole year, at around 20 to 30%, but with a lower percentage at the very beginning of the year (January-March). This can be explained by panic regarding the pandemic in the world only beginning at the beginning of 2020, the fact that the epidemic began in China which neighbors Central Asian, as well as a lack of consistent


¹⁰ Several sources, for example Radio Azzatyk, “Voters are deprived from the illusion of elections” available here <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-sets-january-10-date-for-parliamentary-elections/30905296.html>

¹¹ War and Peace Institute, 2020. Covid-19 Fake News Spreads in Central Asia, available at <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/covid-19-fake-news-spreads-central-asia>

¹² For example, in Kyrgyzstan https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_coronavirus_media_fake_news_2020/30526074.html

information from governments and a lack of understanding about the new virus. All these factors, as well as unprecedented measures, i.e. the closure of all borders, suspension of economic activity, widespread lockdown, led to increasing aggression on social networks.

Figure 1 Hate speech in Central Asia, 2020, by months



Moderate hate speech contains less aggressive statements than hard hate speech. The dynamics of moderate hate speech is slightly different to that of hard hate speech. The peak use of moderate hate speech in Central Asian countries took place in April-June (31%). It means that the first wave of indignation, fear and panic had passed by that time, but nevertheless, people continued to live in uncertainty. By the end of the year, a slight decline was observed. As for soft hate speech in Central Asia, the dynamics of development is logical: after the first months and waves of aggression and fear, life returned to its usual course, and people gradually got used to the new rules. In addition, the legislative measures that we mentioned above played a role.




Figure 2. Themes of hate speech in Central Asia, 2020

Ethnic and sinophobic issues were the most common topics identified in the Internet space of Central Asian countries over the past year. Ethnic and national issues (60%) were the main themes of hate speech. This includes both in relation to each other (Uzbeks-Kazakhs, Uzbeks-Kyrgyz, Kyrgyz-Kazakhs, Tajiks-Uzbeks), and targeted at Chinese and Russian minority populations. For example, the situation between Kazakhs and Dungans on the night of February 8, 2020, when about 23,000 Dungans were forced to cross the state border of Kyrgyzstan overnight¹³. Due to household/domestic conflict, the native population of Kazakhstan has dramatically changed its attitude towards the Dungans. In this situation, xenophobic attitudes, sinophobia and “hard hate speech” were seen. People called for violent actions against the Dungans. Another example is the “cooling” of relations between the Kyrgyz and Tajiks, which are also related to longstanding contested issues, mainly in the border regions of the countries.

Sinophobia is another common topic of hate speech in Central Asian countries. It is widely believed that the Chinese are taking away jobs from local communities, and encroaching on the natural resources and territorial integrity of neighboring states. The appearance and spread of the coronavirus only added to hostility towards the Chinese. For example, the TV channel “Al Jazeera” linked the situation in Kazakhstan with Dungans with sinophobia: “Kazakhs destroy Chinese restaurants for fear of coronavirus infection”¹⁴. Also in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Sinophobic attitudes are often associated with the economic expansion of the Chinese. People of these countries often recall the sad experience of Tajikistan and are afraid of losing their land¹⁵. This gives rise to fake news on this topic.

Let’s consider trends and topics of hate speech in the countries individually.

Figure 3. Cloud of words-themes the most common in case of hate speech in Central Asia, 2020



Kazakhstan

The following sites in Kazakhstan are where hate speech was found most frequently in 2020: zakon.kz, qamshy.kz, stan.kz, abai.kz, alashainasy.kz, qazaquni.kz. Hate speech was found both in the posts and comments and when users shared publications on their pages. The following influencers were leaders in

¹³ Azattyk Radio, Nightmare. Events in the villages of Kordai district: there are victims and wounded, 8 February 2020, available at <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-zhambyl-region-conflict-/30423627.html>

¹⁴ Factcheck.kz, Facts and fakes on conflict in Manaschi village of the Zhambyl region, 8 February 2020, available at <https://factcheck.kz/socium/chto-izvestno-o-konflikte-v-sele-masanchi-zhambylskoj-oblasti/>

¹⁵ Azattyk Radio, Tajikistan gave part of its territory to China, 6 October 2011, available at https://rus.azattyq.org/a/china_tajikistan_kazakhstan_kyrgyzstan_land/24350707.html

the use of hate speech¹⁶: Denis Krivosheev, Ermek Narymbay, Aigul Orynbek, Akhmetbek Nursila, Rasul Zhumaly, Samat Sak.

An aggravated situation in the border regions often became a reason for hate speech. For example, the conflict in the Kordai district, during which 11 people were killed, 192 people, including 19 policemen, were injured to various degrees of severity, 168 residential buildings, shops and cafes were damaged and burned, as well as 122 cars. More than 23 thousand Dungans were forced to flee to the neighboring territory of Kyrgyzstan¹⁷.

Our monitoring during the conflict in Kazakhstan showed that the authorities used the words “riots”, and “hooligan actions”. Rapid and widespread dissemination of videos along with calls for violence on WhatsApp chat and closed Telegram channels led to mass riots. Hard hate speech towards the Dungans and other ethnic groups increased drastically. Dungans were presented by the authorities as the instigators of the conflict, aggressors and outsiders¹⁸. Open calls for violence led to large-scale destruction and many victims. The media and bloggers covered the event more neutrally, and the interethnic nature of the clashes was rarely mentioned. However, comments on articles and publications on social networks were dominated by calls for the expulsion of Dungans from Kazakhstan or forced resettlement. Support for the Kazakhs who took part in the attacks was widespread. Our monitoring activity identified more than 90 messages containing hate speech related to Dungans of which hard hate speech made up 16%.

Also in November, our monitoring recorded an increase of hate speech against Armenians related to the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There was also disinformation on this topic. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan called a message about the weapons supply by Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan an example of fake news. Earlier, some Internet sites and social networks published information that Kazakhstan had started supplying weapons to Azerbaijan.

¹⁶ For example, <https://www.facebook.com/100007981087790/videos/2572342979708380/>;
<https://www.facebook.com/samat.nasir/posts/2848520375206322>;
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2571256403150371&id=100007981087790;
<https://www.facebook.com/samat.nasir/posts/2880687661989593>

¹⁷IA REGNUM, Kordai story: Kazakh authorities play down to national radicals, available at <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2943305.html>

¹⁸ For example, <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/31202722.html>; https://www.inform.kz/ru/nachalsya-sudebnyy-process-po-massovym-besporyadkam-v-kordae_a3725907

Kyrgyzstan

In Kyrgyzstan, hate speech could be seen most often in comments under media posts or in reposts. In particular, during political events and unrest, for example, in October 2020, when protests were launched in Bishkek by those dissatisfied with the results of the parliamentary elections, and the opposition almost seized power. Arslan Alayev is one of the leading opinion leaders whose publications contain hate speech and disinformation¹⁹

Examples of hate speech in Kyrgyzstan.

Gender Equality

Events related to the International Women's Day march/rally that took place in Bishkek on March 8, 2020 and was aggressively dispersed by law enforcement bodies led to hate speech. Internet users produced material reflecting negatively on participants of the march: *"fed up with these women"*, *"let them stay at home, do not go to rallies, it does not suit them"*, and even *"I wish they could all be infected with coronavirus"* and so on. All this was, in turn, supported by comments in support of the police actions. The hate speech was also targeted at representatives of the LGBT community who participated in the rally. Thus, the march was associated with the LGBT community, which added to the negativity. Some photos of the participants with banners were photoshopped with other slogans. Instead of "I am against the violence against women", "Violence must be stopped" the following statements were shown "I will not pour tea", "I will not marry", "I will not give birth". This worked to increase the hatred of the commentators. Video reports and news that international news outlets published articles about the disruption of the march in Kyrgyzstan added further angered people. All of this created an extremely negative attitude and increased aggression towards feminists, the LGBT community and women in general.

Chinese, coronavirus are linked with coronavirus and cinophobia

A large amount of hate speech was directed towards not only those who went to umrah (pilgrimage), but also religious people in general. People blamed them for the cause of all their troubles (*"baleketterdin baary"*), including the coronavirus. Mockery, insults, malicious comments like: *"They probably thought that God would save them there"*, *"They would have stayed there until the end, until death"*, *"They went to enrich the Arabs"* (*"akmaktar"*, *"taalada kalgyrlar"*, *"abatsyz mankurttar"*, *"uydo oturbaysynarby,*

¹⁹ By the time of the developing this review all posts were removed.

muldar”). The MP Aliyarbek Abzhaliyev added to this dialogue, saying that he knows of an acquaintance who returned from a pilgrimage tour and immediately met with his friends²⁰.

Regular reports on coronavirus have had a negative effect on attitudes towards the religious community. A lot of news in the Kyrgyz segment contained the headline *“infected with coronavirus, returned from the Hajj”*. There were other headlines such as: *“Those who returned from the Hajj infected with coronavirus ask to let them go home”*, *“At the airport they said that they should not be checked because they are saints”*, *“Those infected with coronavirus returned to Bishkek on March 2 and managed to hold toi (celebrations) for 150 people”*. News was published regarding how many people had left for the Hajj, and how many more would return from there. Whilst it is of course important to report on these issues, and to raise awareness of the risks associated with large religious gatherings and travel to holy sites during the pandemic, these reports led to a lot of anger towards religious groups and hate speech in the comments section of media, increasing a negative attitude toward religious communities.

Tajikistan

Our media monitors have noted a lot of hate speech and disinformation on the Tajik online sites: Asia-plus, avesto, ozodi, Khavar. In 2020, the coronavirus was the most popular topic like everywhere else. In addition, politics, extremism and terrorism and border conflicts were also popular. In general, Asia Plus and ozodi sites did not publish directly hate speech, but there was a large amount in comments, as well as on the pages of these resources in social networks. Ittiloot.com, asia.times, ozodi, Khovar, hamsinf, asia-plus, avesto and sputnik also use social media to disseminate their news and information, and there were hate speech comments on theirs too. In all 3 countries, except Uzbekistan, WhatsApp and Facebook messengers are leading in spreading hate speech and disinformation.

Let's focus on specific examples. In March 2020, Ozodi Radio published an article about a journalist who returned from the United States and took a coronavirus test when he got back to Tajikistan on a voluntary basis. He described in detail the reaction of the Tajik physicians when they heard the word “coronavirus”. *“Instead of helping me, they began to move away from me, afraid to approach me”*, - the journalist writes. This material has caused a lot of disputes. Although the writer’s story is not in itself hate speech, his readers strongly criticized the health workers and accused them of corruption, expressing fear that *“if the virus occurs in the country, the physicians would be the first to run away”*²¹, helping to foster a negative attitude toward health workers.

²⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/azattyk.org/videos/644524922781386/>

²¹ Ozodi Radio, *Chi hel man dar Dushanbe az tash-hisi coronavirus guzashtam*. AKS, available at <https://www.ozodi.org/a/blog-coronavirus-mullorajab-yusufi/30493303.html>

Uzbekistan

UPL sites (refers to a number of unregistered media) and vesti.uz (news portal), are where most of the reported cases of hate speech are concentrated. In addition to general information on coronavirus, there was a lot of coverage on methods of treatment (mainly traditional remedies) or “belief in a miracle”, and extremism and terrorism. UPL’s public posts, Odnoklassniki, chats, and mailing lists in Telegram channels and on Facebook often contained cases of hate speech and disinformation.

Examples of identified hate speech cases in Uzbekistan.

Case 1. “The girl who recovered from coronavirus gave an interview for Uzbekistan 24” - under this heading an article that caused a surge of negativity was published. In the comments, there was a hint that the girl was engaged in prostitution in Turkey, a hostile attitude to those infected who arrived from abroad, turning to everyday nationalism (“*You discredit Uzbekistan*”, “*Go to your Azerbaijan*”, “*Stupid fanatics*”). In general, there is no hostile attitude towards people from Caucasus in Uzbekistan. But during COVID-19 pandemic a reference of any nationality of those coming to Uzbekistan boosted individual (non massive) nationalistic rhetoric, mostly in the comments of social medias’ users and were related to the panic and fear spread among the audience.


*Case 2. “The US Ambassador in London stated that China has put the whole world at risk”*²². The site is characterized by the confrontation between Russia and the United States, but the pandemic overlapped in the comments and resulted in hate speech in relation to the Americans: “*Now, let the States stay in***. They are skanks who deliberately undermine the economies of other countries, in particular China. Because it is the competitor*”, “*If the Americans die out as a nation, or the States go under water, cover them with a volcano, the rest of the world will breathe freely and say only thank you*”.

Fake news and disinformation in Central Asia

The pandemic, which began in 2020, has favoured the emergence and rapid spread of disinformation and fake news in Central Asia. In April-June, the most fake news and disinformation (32%) was recorded which coincided with the peak of the pandemic and introduction of restrictive measures on movement and routine activities. A little more was observed (almost 40%) in the third quarter (July-September 2020), when there were unexplained and severe situations with coronavirus infection in some countries.

²² News of Uzbekistan, <https://upl.uz>

Figure 4. Scope of disinformation in Central Asian states, by months



In general, the list of the most frequently encountered topics of fake news and disinformation in 2020 did not differ much. As a rule, these are “coronavirus” and “Chinese”, what is quite understandable in view of the main event of last year and fact that China was the originator of the epidemic. Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that the hate speech in relation to the Chinese is a new discourse in Central Asian countries. In the past, as it was regularly present in the past in connection with China’s participation in certain economic spheres. In addition, there were such topics such as “Islam”, “Internet jokes”, “the Covid situation in Italy”, “Politics”, “disease treatment”, conspiracy theories and others.

Traditional remedies against coronavirus

It is one of the most common topics of fake news and disinformation. People felt themselves lost in informational chaos and tried to cope on their own. In Kazakhstan, a post was published in one of the Facebook groups that “*vodka kills the coronavirus in half a minute*”²³. Three anonymous reports of poisoned water were denied by the Ministry of Health. Senders of audio messages via WhatsApp warned

²³ Factcheck.kz, available here <https://factcheck.kz/v-mire/vodka-ubivaet-koronavirus-za-polminuty-novyj-fejk-gulyaet-v-socsetyax/>

people to be afraid of water and carbonated drinks, allegedly “*through water they will poison everyone. So with water now, look, young children and young people are being poisoned*”²⁴.

In Kyrgyzstan, journalist Tynchtyk Altymyshev and singer Kural Chokoyev made and posted a video in which they talk about the possibility of using the hijama technique against coronavirus²⁵. Representatives of the Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic denied this information and called for refraining from the procedure of bloodletting²⁶. In Uzbekistan, in addition to hijama, COVID-19 cures with cumin, ginger and turmeric, which are allegedly written in the Book of the Prophet²⁷ were proposed. In Kazakhstan, badger, dog, lamb fat, horseradish, onion, garlic water, cabbage, sumac, seaweed, adraspan, and even the salt of Lake Kobeytuz were added to the listed recipes for coronavirus. The issue was particularly hotly discussed because of the illegal collection of salt on the “pink” lake, since after the spread of this fake news, people began to collect salt for gargling for preventive purposes and disturbed the ecosystem of the lake²⁸. A humorous article about a new coronavirus vaccine made from the blood of the first president of the country, without checking for authenticity, was quickly spread by the media. There was also a quick rebuttal of this information from officials²⁹. The website that released it was blocked³⁰.

Conspiracy Theory

“Covid-dissidence”, as the BBC journalists called the huge number of followers who of false theories related to the cause and purpose of the pandemic. The appearance of so many examples of fake news and disinformation is associated with distrust in state bodies, “high levels of powerlessness, anger, as well as low self-esteem or psychological problems”³¹. Conspiracy theories have accompanied all global epidemics. The French website Conspiracy Watch has tracked trends related to global epidemics. The plague epidemic in the fourteenth century, cholera in the nineteenth century, AIDS in the 1980s, the Zika virus, Ebola, H1N1 flu in 2009-2010, all of them were accompanied by various conspiracy theories: Jews and lepers deliberately poisoning wells, aristocracy intent on destroying the people, governments locking

²⁴ Factcheck.kz, available here <https://factcheck.kz/v-mire/fejkovuyu-rassylku-ob-otravlennoj-vode-oproverg-minzdrav/>

²⁵ News resource 24.kg, available here https://24.kg/obschestvo/159514_kyrgyzstantsyi_prinyalis_lechit_COVID-19hidjamoy_minzdrav_kategoricheski_protiv/

²⁶ Kloop.kz, 2020

²⁷ Kloop.kz, 2020

²⁸ Zakon.kz, 2020

²⁹ Zakon.kz, 2020

³⁰ Zakon.kz, 2020

³¹ Russian service BBC, Anatomy of “Covid-dessidnce”. Why is it so easy to believe in a conspiracy against a backdrop of a pandemic, <https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-55438177>

people in camps, forced vaccination and introduction of chips, global tracking, bioweapons, and so on³². The coronavirus infection was no exception, and along with previous conspiracy theories, it gave rise to new ones³³.

False information about COVID-19 in Kyrgyzstan spread rapidly in the country long before the official announcement of the Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, which led to a speculation in food markets and pharmacies. The pandemic has contributed to increasing information vulnerability in society. Along with fake news about the coronavirus, there was an increase of disinformation that was not directly related to COVID-19. The report on harm caused to the environment by the new generation of 5G wireless communication is one of the examples of false information. In early April, information spread that 5G technology harms not only nature, but also human health, causing headaches, cancer, skin damage, metabolic disorders and impotence. The State Committee for Information Technologies and Communications of the Kyrgyz Republic denied this information, adding that such false reports were disseminated earlier during the introduction of 3G and 4G technologies. It is worth saying that to date, 5G technology has not yet been introduced in Kyrgyzstan.

In Whatsapp messenger, an audio recording was actively disseminated, in which one woman said that the planned shutdown of broadcasting in Kazakhstan on August 19 was associated with 5G connection – *“terrible thing that can be fatal for children”*. The author of the mailing list advised people to turn off Wi-Fi, TVs and stay away from mobile phones. According to official information from “Kazteleradio”, the shutdown was due to scheduled maintenance works.

Mass vaccinations against coronavirus in Russia and in Europe was one of the most popular topics of December 2020 in Kazakhstan. As expected, fake news began to spread that the new vaccine threatens people’s health. In early November, the social networks reacted to the publication *“The Russian vaccine against COVID-19 turned out to be a veterinary drug”*. This reaction was provoked by a Facebook post of Alexander Kudryavtsev, a junior researcher at the Institute of Biochemical Physics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Stopfake.kz found out that text of the post and the caption to the picture talk about two different vaccines and that this original message was infact a fake.

³² Conspiracy Watch, <https://www.conspiracywatch.info/>

³³ RFI, <https://www.rfi.fr/ru>

Another example of disinformation was related to the frightening number of deaths from the coronavirus. For example, a video with bodies in black bags, disseminated in the comments section in the Kazakh media segment (Tsirulik, 2020) was labeled as fake by the authorities of Mangystau. In early July, a video of a mass grave in Kyrgyzstan became popular on the Internet. In



the video, people in protective suits throw bags into the pit, each of which, presumably, contains corpses. In fact, the action took place in India, and the video was published back in June on Indian YouTube channels³⁴. On social networks, a video was distributed in which an unknown woman says that a plane sprays poison over in Aktau. This fake news and hate speech is very similar to medieval fake news about Jews poisoning wells, which just shows that fake news around diseases is nothing new³⁵? The management of the Aktau airport commented on this video, explaining in detail how such an effect was made in the air (Inform.kz).

In Kazakhstan, in September, Instagram actively disseminated and still distributes a video in which it is reported that remote thermometers or pyrometers are dangerous to human health and even life. In the video, a female voice-over says that “according to some data, daily temperature measurements using a remote device is fraught with a harmful effect on human blood composition and even fatal”. In fact, both technical and medical thermometers are based on radiation of infrared spectrum. The devices do not send radiation, but on the contrary — fix rays and measure (Stopfake.kz). The WhatsApp messenger began to distribute a video in which a man pours water into regular medical masks and demonstrates that liquid does not seep through the fabric. At the end of the video, the author concludes that since water does not seep through the fabric of the mask, then oxygen does not enter when breathing, which means that people are poisoned with carbon dioxide while wearing masks. Another WhatsApp newsletter contains a message that people are being handed out medical masks and says that this is a new initiative of the local authorities. They allegedly ask you to put on a mask to see if it suits you. And the mask is impregnated with chemicals with a narcotic effect. Then, they just rob people.

In Telegram chats, information was disseminated stating that if patients with coronavirus are detected in educational institutions, these organizations will be closed for quarantine. In addition, the author of the text writes that the schools will be “guarded by the army”, and “parents will not be allowed to see

³⁴ Kaktus.media, 2020

³⁵ Image on the right: Burning of the Jews during plague. Miniature from the manuscript of Gilles Le Muizy “Antiquitates Flandriae”. 1349–1352 годы, Bibliothèque royale de Belgique

children”. At the same time, for some reason, a video from Instagram, which is not related to Kazakhstan, is cited as evidence, in which a woman reports on the alleged quarantine measures in Israel (Stopfake.kz).

Politics (elections, territorial integrity)

Just before the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, the Internet was full of fake news about the elections. For example, on September 5, the Vesti.kg editorial board published the list of parties and the numbers under which they were to be represented on the ballot, but at that time the CEC of the Kyrgyz Republic had not yet drawn lots to determine the numbers of parties on the ballot. Later, news sites removed its publication. Or, for example, photos of banners of the political party “Reform” out on the streets were sent out on the social networks of the Kyrgyz segment, which were allegedly placed around the city. But in fact they had not been placed out on the streets... the images had been photoshopped to make it look like people had been putting out posters.

In connection with the unrest that began after results of the parliamentary elections, there was widespread dissemination of fake news on the Internet. In the media, with reference to the press service of the National Security State Committee, information was provided that operational-combat groups of special services began to work in Bishkek. It was also reported that if the criminal elements resist, the special services will destroy them. The material also indicated a contact number to call when they are detected. In social networks, a screenshot of the alleged news agency Sputnik.kg also appeared, which indicates that the Russian military allegedly arrived at the air base in Kant.

In Kyrgyzstan, fake news was associated with the theme of elections in the country. On November 16, a number of the media published the news that former Minister of Interior Kashkar Dzhunushaliyev, who escaped during the revolution, was spotted at a concert in Moscow. The popular telegram-channel “Kompromat” is the source of information; it wrote on its page that Dzhunushaliyev was seen “at the concert for the Russian Police Day” on November 15 in

**КАЧЫП КЕТКЕН КАШКАР ДЖУНУШАЛИЕВ
МОСКВАДА КОНЦЕРТ КӨРҮП ОТУРАТ (ВИДЕО)**

16.11.2020

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Moscow. Factcheck.kg checked this information and found out that Dzhunushaliyev actually attended the concert in 2019. Just before the presidential election, information that Member of the Parliament Zhanar Akayev will head the headquarters of the candidate Sadyr Zhaparov in Osh in the upcoming elections

appeared on the Internet. However, Zhanar Akayev himself denied this information in an interview with radio “Maral” next day.


In Kazakhstan, provocative statements by Russian officials about the allegedly dubious ownership of the territories of Kazakhstan caused concern, resulting in a wave of negative comments, increased Russophobia among Kazakhstanis and hate speech towards Russia. At the same time, there was information that the National Liberation Movement allegedly operating officially in Kazakhstan³⁶. In Kaznet, there was a message about the existence of the NLM organization, whose goal is to destroy the territorial integrity and independence of Kazakhstan. The deputy of the State Duma of Russia Yevgeny Fedorov is its head, as they write in social networks. Comments on Kaznet said that NLM works openly and even recruits new members among Kazakhstanis, inviting them to its offices in Almaty and Nur-Sultan.

In early October, a video was disseminated on social networks and Telegram in Uzbekistan showing the destruction of a fence with barbed wire by citizens (allegedly on the Uzbek border) holding a flag similar to the Uzbek one. In fact, this video was shot on August 15, 2020 in Bashkortostan (Russia), where during a protest action there were clashes between PSC personnel and protesters against the felling of trees on Kushtau mountain. Due to the similarity of the flags of Uzbekistan and Bashkortostan, the incident was misinterpreted by users.

In Tajikistan, the topic of migrants has received a lot of responses. In particular, it was the statement of the Mayor of Moscow about Tajik migrants. On October 19, the website Pressa.tj placed an article titled “Sobyanin: Moscow will be worse off without Tajiks” according to which Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin allegedly said that the Russian capital is in urgent need of Tajik migrants as winter approaches. However, the interview referred to a 40 percent shortage of migrants, without mentioning nationality.

Monkeyshines (phishing attacks and similar scams)


On the eve of the New Year in Kyrgyzstan, users of the WhatsApp began to receive a newsletter – Christmas gifts from Amazon and New Year’s gift from Huawei. The mailing list “from Amazon” offered a small survey and in return a gift card for \$500. Factcheck.kg editorial board checked this newsletter and strongly recommended not to click through the link in order to avoid problems with information security³⁷.



³⁶ News source 24.kz, available here <https://24.kz/ru/news/social/item/444847-v-kazahstane-dejstvuuet-organizatsiya-nod-fejk>

³⁷ <https://factcheck.kg/ochedrnaya-rassylka-ot-moshennikov.../>

In November, a video about the ghost of a blonde girl in the Khankol village became one of the most popular fake news. “We are talking about video which was uploaded to social networks and sent via messengers by residents of the Khankol village in the Karatobinsky district of the West Kazakhstan region. Earlier, residents of the Khankol village said that the ghost of a girl with blonde hair keeps the whole area in fear. According to them, the ghost knocks on windows and walks along the highway, scaring passing motorists. Some drivers claim that the ghost appears in their cars and prevents them from driving their car”. This message was replicated by the media and major public sites. The audience, mostly with irony, reacted to the police check and the reaction of the officials. However, there were also those who believed in the existence of the ghost; they wrote these things in the comments. Later, Factcheck.kz published a clarification stating that the story was not real... and was complete fantasy. This was not the first time this video had gone viral on social networks and media. A year ago, it appeared in the Russian Internet space, and each time the video is use it is set in a new region with a new description as the place of action. So, for example, in this case there is exactly the same video, but allegedly from the Lipetsk region. Although largely harmless it illustrates how people can be easily misled by such videos and stories.



There are also plenty of real and harmful scams out there, especially Phishing attacks. An example is with Toyota Camry cars announced by Khabib Nurmagomedov on the website khabib-camry.com. The announcement said you could win a Toyota Camry or get a cash prize, you just

had to become a member, then you are invited to take a short survey and then send a newsletter via the WhatsApp messenger. The link that you are offered to follow leads to a phishing site that steals usernames and passwords. Experts identified more than ten similar Internet resources, which included a survey form on behalf of Nurmagomedov. Khabib’s official representatives stressed that the Russian boxer does not do anything like this. This type of fake news appears from time to time.

Conclusion

It is difficult to fit the whole situation and all examples in one material, since this topic requires huge resources and information processing. A team of media monitors from four countries monitored 787,335 messages during the year, and only 6,199 of them were examples of disinformation or hate speech. This is only 0.8% of the total number of monitored messages, which in the overall context can be considered as quite positive.

Summing up the results of 2020, one can say that Central Asia, as elsewhere, was caught up in an infodemic and a wave of sinophobia. The authorities of some countries did not immediately recognize that there is a coronavirus infection in the country and did not take urgent measures, which became a catalyst for the infodemic. People were spread unverified and unofficial information on social networks and through communication channels, which led to panic and chaos. For example, in Turkmenistan, people bought flour on a mass scale, in other countries – food products, including “magic” ginger, garlic, lemon and other vegetables and fruits containing vitamin C were sought.

Regarding hate speech, there were similar dynamics of development with the trends of disinformation. Main topics (ethnic, national and religious) and related (gender equality, language issues - Russian vs local languages) were also present. The first group is more familiar, and already relatively common, in the Internet space, so it is possible to predict it in advance. The second group of topics can be considered more of a “sorcerer's box” due to its unpredictability, and, as a rule, such topics require a particular occasion or event to provoke their appearance.

The BRYCA project team calls on everyone to be vigilant when spreading any information, verify the original source, be media literate and do not use hate speech.



This review is based on the results of media monitoring conducted within the framework of the BRYCA project “Media and Information Literacy for improving critical thinking of the youth in Central Asia”. Monitoring has been conducted since January 2020 in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The BRYCA project is implemented with the financial support of the European Union.

All examples presented in the review are provided for informational purposes only. We are categorically against the use of the hate speech of any tone or type.

This publication was prepared under financial support of the European Union. The content of this publication is the responsibility of the BRYCA project media monitoring team and does not reflect the views of the European Union.

Selected materials of the media monitoring

Manipulation: “One participants of the COVID-19 vaccine testing was occurred in severe conditions”
<https://stopfake.kz/ru/archives/3795>

Manipulation, Six participants of the COVID-19 Pfizer vaccine testing died
<https://factcheck.kz/.../manipulyaciya-umerli-shest.../>

Fake: “COVID-19 vaccine causes HIV and malaria” <https://stopfake.kz/ru/archives/3821>

Fake: “COVID-19 vaccine changes изменяет DNA, and the billionaires will patent those vaccinated”
<https://stopfake.kz/ru/archives/3402>

Factcheck.kg, Was Kashkar Zhunushaliev in Moscow on November 15, 2020? Fake, available at
<https://factcheck.kg/kashkar-dzhunushaliev-byi-v-moskve.../>





Maral FM, Акаев: Мени Жапаровдун штабын жетектейт деген маалымат калп, available at
<https://maral.fm.kg/archives/452527>

Fake: “NOD organization operates in Kazakhstan”, <https://stopfake.kz/ru/archives/3850>).

“Policemen were sent to the Khankol village, where the ghost of blond girl scared local people”,
<https://tengrinews.kz/.../politseyskih-otpravili-selo.../>

Fake-video with “the ghost” from Russia forced the WKR’s administration to conducts ceremonies and checks, November 17, 2020, <https://factcheck.kz/.../fejk-video-s-prizrakom-iz.../>.

LIST OF THE MAIN RESOURCES OF MEDIA MONITORING

 <p>MEDIA:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Kaktus Media 2. Kloop.kg 3. Akipress 4. K-nnews 5. Bishkek Evening 6. Sputnik.kg 7. Infogram 8. Kyrgyz News 9. News of KG 10. Kyrgyz Azattyk Unalgyyy 11. Super Info 12. Maalyimat 13. El Gezit 14. Next TV 15. 24.kg 16. Achyk Akyyn 17. Sputnik 18. BBC News KG 19. Akipress 20. TRT Kyrgyz 	<p>OPINION LEADERS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ULAN USEYUN 2. ARSTANBEK ABDYLDAEV 3. CHURBAK AZHY ALILOV 4. RITA KARASARTOVA 5. ILM KARYPBEKOV 6. ASEL KADYRBEKOVA 7. TIMUR FAIZIEV 8. ABDYSHUKUR NORMATOV 9. DASTAN BEKESHEV 10. ALTYN KAPALOVA 11. BEKTUR ISKENDER 12. GULMIRA TYNALIEVA 13. MERIM OSMONALIEVA 14. GULNURA TORALIEVA 15. KADYR MALIKOV 16. VALENTINA PAKHMAN 17. BOLOT IBRAGIMOV 	<p>GROUPS AND PUBLICS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. OMKs 2. BESPREDEL.KG 3. KOMPROMAT.KG 4. BLACK LIST 5. NAM NE PONRAVILOS 6. DIESEL.ELCAT.KG 7. AKIPRESS 8. KAKTUS MEDIA 9. AZATYK MEDIA 10. KLOOP 11. NEWS OF KYRGYZSTAN 12. KYRGYZSTAN2020 13. KABARCHY.KG 14. AVTORYNOK KYRGYZSTAN
 <p>MEDIA:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. newreporter.org 2. factcheck.kz 3. caravan.kz 4. tengrinews.kz 5. nur.kz 6. total.kz 7. zakon.kz 8. sputnik.kz 9. hula.news.kz 10. 365info.kz 11. Egemen.kz 12. Aikyn.kz 13. Stan.kz 14. Qamshy.kz 15. Sn.kz 16. Baribar.kz 17. Alashainasy.kz 18. Qazaqumi.kz 19. Jasqazaq.kz 20. Zhasalash.kz 21. Abai.kz 	<p>OPINION LEADERS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ERZHAN RASHEV 2. AIDOS SYRYM 3. DOSYM SATPAEV 4. KAYRAT KUDAI BERGEN 5. BAYAN ALAIGUZOVA 6. DIRIS KRIVOSHEEV 7. NURTAS ADAMBAEV 8. ALTAY BAISHULAKOV 9. SERIKZHAN ESENGOSULY 10. ERIK K. NARIMBAY 11. AMIRZHAN KOSANOV 12. MUZHAMEDZHAN TAZABEK 13. RASUL ZHUMALY 14. MUKHTAR TAIZHAN 15. SERIK ABAS-SHAKH 16. AIGUL ORYNBEK 17. SAMAT SAK 18. DINA ELOZEK 19. SAKEN MAIGAZIEV 20. AKHMETBEK NURSILA 	<p>GROUPS AND PUBLICS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "ATAMHYN BASY-AI" FB 2. "DUNIEZHUI KAZAKTAR" FB 3. "SHYNDYKTAN KASHA ALMAYSYN" FB 4. "ZHAGA USTATTY" FB 5. "KAZAKH ULTSHYLDARY" FB 6. "ZTB_KZ" - INSTAGRAM 7. "EAPGRAM" - INSTAGRAM 8. "ZIBI QAZAQSTAN" - VK 9. OYAN KAZAKHSTAN - FB 10. KOK TEAM- FACEBOOK 11. DEP OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS ALMAY - FB 12. UNDER SKY OF KAZAKHSTAN - VK 13. RAKETA - VK 14. LADA.KZ - VK 15. ALMATY. WHAT? WHERE? WHEN?
 <p>MEDIA:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ASIA Agency 2. Hovar National Agency 3. Avesto Agency 4. "Ozodi" Radio 5. "SugdNEWS" 6. "Sputnik" 7. "Soqhd truth" 8. "Dushanbe evening-Vechyorika" 9. "Tochikiston" 10. "Oylik" 11. "Faraj" 	<p>OPINION LEADERS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. RACHAB MIRZO 2. KHILVATSHOKH MAKHMUD 3. SAIDMUKHIDDIN DUSTMUKHAMADYON 4. SAIF DOSTIEV 5. BAKHMATILLO ZOYIROV 6. SALIMI AYUBZOD 7. MIRZO SALIMPUR 8. MAVDUDA SOHIBNAZAROVA 9. SAIDDJAFAR USMONZODA 10. IKBOL TESHAEV 11. NEGMATULLO MIRSALDOV 12. ZEBO TADJIBAEVA 13. ZULFIYA SOLUBEVA 14. LULIYA GAININA 15. GULNORA AMIRSHOEVA 16. RUSTAM GULOV 17. MANZURA MAHKAMOVA 18. CHONI SAFARZODA 	<p>GROUPS AND PUBLICS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NIGONI NAV/НОВЫЙ ВЗГЛЯД 2. #NASILYU NET 3. TAJIK MAMA GROUP 4. INFORMATION FOR DELIBERATION 5. REVIEW OF NEWS SOGO 6. WE TAJIKISTAN 7. WOMEN COUNCIL TJ 8. ASIA RILUS 9. YOUTH OF SUGHD 10. I LOVE KHUJAND 11. CENTRAL ASIA: POLITICS, SOCIETY AND RELIGION 12. WE PEOPLE OF TAJIKISTAN / MO-TOCHIKISTONIEM! 13. АКСОРИ ТОЧИКИСТОН-NEWS OF TAJIKISTAN
 <p>MEDIA:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. kun.uz 2. gazeta.uz 3. podrobno.uz 4. nuz.uz 5. spot.uz 6. snhor.uz 7. repost.uz 8. vot.uz 9. up24.uz 10. uzdaily.uz 11. vkratce.uz 12. xabar.uz 13. vesti.uz 14. daryo.uz 15. qalampir.uz 16. mytube.uz 17. mover.uz 18. fergananews.com 19. centralasia.media 20. sputnik.uz 21. ozodlik.uz 	<p>OPINION LEADERS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. AZIZA UMAROVA 2. NOMIL ZILAMZHONOV 3. SHERZOD KUDRATKHODJAEV 4. LOLA KARIMOVA 5. NIKITA MAKARENKO 6. IRINA MARIYENKO 7. FERNANDA MANCHINI 8. SASHA IVANYUZHENKO 9. FERUZKHAN YAKUBKHODJAEV 10. ALI KAKHAROV 11. KHUSHNODIR KHUDDIBERDIYEV (TG LINK) 12. NIGORA AKILOVA 13. KIRILL DAVILETOV 14. YULYU ALTMAN 15. UMID YUSUPOV GAFUROV 	<p>GROUPS AND PUBLICS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ALTER EGO (YOUTUBE LINK) 2. WOMEN EMPOWERMENT CLUB TASHKENT 3. MDK.UZ 4. OBSERVATIONS UNDER SYCAMORE 5. YOUTH PORTAL 6. FASHION THERAPY 7. NE MDK'LHI 8. MASTABA 9. POTREBTEL.UZ 10. INSIDER 11. TABLE WITH A VIEW ON PLANET 12. DAUGHTER OF IRON DRAGON 13. PICKUPPER.UZ 14. TROLL.UZ (FB LINK) 15. DRIVERS.UZ 16. POTREBTEL PLUS 17. POST EVERYTHING WHAT IS FORBIDDEN

*The list contains only main resources included in the media monitoring.